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DOES PUBLIC HEALTH START WITHIN
JAILS? A NEW INCENTIVE FOR REFORM
OF WISCONSIN’S BAIL SYSTEM
Wisconsin’s Milwaukee and Dane Counties are among many jurisdictions
in the country employing modern bail reforms, specifically the Public Safety
Assessment (PSA). Most of these jurisdictions adopted the PSA before the
advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, but are increasingly
relevant as the virus continues to derail public health measures. Through the
intersection of detainees, correctional officers, judicial officials, attorneys, and
visitors, millions of Americans filter in and out of correctional facilities on an
annual basis. These facilities serve as a microcosm of society and breeding
ground for mass infection. The COVID-19 pandemic amplified an existing need
for reform of correctional facilities to better protect the rights and health of
pretrial detainees. This Comment examines the efficacy of the PSA and other
currently employed bail reform measures and concludes with how the State of
Wisconsin can adopt stronger measures to effectively assess risk while
maintaining the liberties of pretrial detainees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What can be done in a space of thirty-five square feet? This list is not
exhaustive, but it does include parking small automobiles, putting in place a
queen-sized mattress, and housing persons in a correctional facility. In 2021,
perhaps the more important question is, what cannot be done in this same
amount of space? Effective social distancing and curbing viral transmission of
infectious diseases are practically impossible in such confined spaces. The
American Correctional Association (ACA), the nation’s largest accrediting
body for private correctional facilities, recommends that multi-occupancy cells
provide at least thirty-five square feet of unencumbered1 space per occupant.2
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) echoes this recommendation of thirtyfive square feet per occupant,3 yet for both bodies, this figure is no more than a
recommendation. In 1991, the BOP conceded that at this thirty-five square foot
per occupant figure, the combined facilities under its purview were operating
at 60% above “rated capacity.”4 In the three decades since that determination,
the rate of incarceration and detained population has grown exponentially—
further exacerbating the crowded conditions of correctional facilities in
America. In 2019, nine states and the BOP all operated at 100% or greater over

1. The ACA defines “unencumbered space” as usable space excluding the square footage of
furniture and fixtures such as a mattress or toilet. AM. CORR. ASS’N, CORE JAIL STANDARDS 3 (2010),
http://correction.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Core-Jail-Standards-as-printed-June-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HU9-NVQS].
2. Id.
3. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL PRISONS: REVISED DESIGN STANDARDS
COULD SAVE EXPANSION FUNDS 5 (1991), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-91-54.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5RZ-RNU3].
4. Id. The Department of Justice defines “rated capacity” as the number of prisoners or beds a
facility can hold, as set by a rating official. Rated capacity is one of three commonly used capacity
standards alongside design capacity and operational capacity. Terms & Definitions: State and Federal
Prison
Facility
Characteristics,
BUREAU
OF
JUST.
STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm/content/acf/index.cfm?ty=tdtp&tid=133
[https://perma.cc/FMR94VR4].
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capacity and forty-one total states operated at least 75% over capacity.5 With
more and more individuals confined to smaller and smaller spaces, any effort
to curb the transmission of infectious diseases will be stymied.
COVID-19, also known as the novel coronavirus, is believed to have
initially appeared in the United States in January 2020.6 Within weeks, the lifethreatening virus quickly spread throughout the country.7 While potentially
dangerous for all groups of people, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has
identified a number of groups of whom exposure to COVID-19 is particularly
dangerous, including the following: persons over sixty-five years of age and
persons with underlying medical conditions such as cancer, Type 2 diabetes,
immunological deficiencies, and obesity, among several other medical
conditions.8 Due to the inherent design of and often inadequate medical
resources within jails and prisons, the ability to control and minimize the spread
of COVID-19 is considerably limited.9 Between March 2020 and March 2021,
there were more than 663,000 confirmed cases, amongst both the incarcerated
and staff, from approximately 1,200 correctional or detention facilities in the
United States.10 In Fresno, California, one facility alone has led to the infection

5. These figures represent conclusions made upon the highest number of the three capacity
standards. In many studies, researchers employ tests based on both the highest and lowest capacity
standards to account for variances across the states. For example, Pennsylvania facilities have a rated
capacity greater than its operational capacity, while Arizona’s operational capacity is greater than in
its rated capacity. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2019 24–25 (2020),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7JQ-KWAJ]; Emily Widra, Since You
Asked: Just How Overcrowded Were Prisons Before the Pandemic, and at This Time of Social
Distancing, How Overcrowded are They Now?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/12/21/overcrowding/ [https://perma.cc/2FA4-6AWS].
6. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/KLV8XA8D].
7. Id.
8. COVID-19 Information for Specific Groups of People, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION
(Feb.
25,
2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z657-8847].
9. See How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 14, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html
[https://perma.cc/8E3U-JCBT].
10. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/10/us/covid-prison-outbreak.html
[https://perma.cc/SY46-7XR9].
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of almost 4,000 individuals in that same time span.11 Within these populations
are individuals yet to be convicted of any crime. In March 2020, it was
estimated that there were over 470,000 people incarcerated nationwide who had
not been convicted of any crime yet. As a result, over 60% of incarcerated
individuals have not been found guilty of any crime, yet they remain in jail,
subject to heightened risks of transmission and infection.12
An increasing need for reform of correctional facilities coupled with a
public health disaster creates a new impetus for actionable change to better
protect the rights of pretrial detainees.
Beyond potentially rampant
transmission of diseases among incarcerated individuals, jails and prisons
provide an incubating hub for disease for an entire community. In 2018, the
average daily population of jails nationwide was just under 750,000
individuals.13 In that same year, there were 10,675,400 admissions into
American jails.14 Additionally, in 2018, the weekly inmate turnover rate was
55%, and inmates spent on average twenty-five days in jails per admission.15
Given the constant rate of entry into jails, these facilities do not just serve
as detention centers but revolving doors for the community. As such, the
contacts within a jail extend far beyond the walls of the facility.16 Conceivably,
a detainee can enter a jail, which is experiencing a high rate of transmission,
remain incarcerated for a week, test positive for COVID-19, get released, return
to their home, and infect the remaining members of their household.
Additionally, jail staff, attorneys, other law enforcement, and a variety of
individuals regularly come in close contact with detainees before returning to
their larger communities.17 With exposure to COVID-19 droplets causing
infection in as few as fifteen minutes, the potential for widespread transmission
11. Early Coronavirus Cases in Nursing Homes, Prisons and Other Locations, N.Y. Times (2022)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-case-outbreaks.html
[https://perma.cc/SUK22FBZ]. It is important to note that the tracking of prison and jail related COVID data largely slowed
or stopped completely by several media outlets in 2021; thus, these figures represent infection prior to
the outbreak of both the Delta and Omicron variants, which witnessed rapid transmission in 2021.
12. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html#slideshows/slidesho
w1/2 [https://perma.cc/9TW5-XV79].
13. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JAIL INMATES IN 2018 2 (2020),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5G9-3QD3].
14. Id. at 1–2.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Camilla Strassle & Benjamin Berkman, Prisons and Pandemics, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1083, 1091 (2020).
17. Id.
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in—and subsequently outside of—jails is tremendously high.18 Thus,
increasing attention towards curbing the spread of COVID-19 in correctional
facilities is a logical objective for broader community health.
Due to their experience with such a high potential rate of transmission in
these facilities, prisoners are currently seeking redress, primarily under claims
that continued confinement is an imposition on their Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights or through habeas corpus petitions.19 However, in
jurisdictions adhering to a bail system, indigent detainees may sit in jail cells
for months simply due to an inability to pay for their bail and not because of a
heightened risk they will abscond or a perceived risk to their communities. In
Wisconsin, financial considerations are still used in determining the conditions
of release of detainees. While individual counties like Milwaukee County and
Dane County have made significant reforms to reduce the financial burdens on
low-risk detainees,20 there has not been state-level action to make these same
reforms that will help curb the spread of COVID-19, reduce costs on taxpayers,
and uphold the rights of the accused. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 969.035, judges
are entitled to impose monetary conditions on release based on detainees’
likelihood of appearing for trial. However, these monetary conditions are
customarily applied based on the degree of the alleged offense with little regard
to the actual threat of absconding.
With the continuing threat of a global pandemic spreading throughout the
country, there is a growing impetus for states like Wisconsin to reduce their
incarcerated populations by enacting sensible bail reforms that effectively
consider a detainee’s real threat to their communities or likelihood to abscond.
This Comment will provide an overview of how pandemics have historically
affected jails and prisons, undertake a review of the cash bail system and its
roots in the American criminal justice system, discuss the current limitations of
jurisdictions with cash bail systems, compare Wisconsin’s statewide inaction
to action taken by some of its own counties or other states, and identify
18. See How COVID-19 Spreads, supra note 9.
19. Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D. Or. 2020); Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d
1103 (N.D. Ill. 2020); Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
20. Abigail Becker, Early Research Shows Fewer Inmates Flattened COVID-19 Curve at Dane
County Jail, THE CAP. TIMES, (Aug. 1, 2020), https://madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-andpolitics/early-research-shows-fewer-inmates-flattened-covid-19-curve-at-dane-countyjail/article_7fd4ebb9-59fa-56c2-8952-3668f5d61ad2.html [https://perma.cc/4L35-RA4C]; Ann-Elise
Henzl, Milwaukee County’s Use of Risk Assessment Tool Keeps Some People Out of Jail While
Awaiting
Trial,
MILWAUKEE
PUB.
MEDIA,
(May
25,
2017,
1:00
AM),
https://www.wuwm.com/post/milwaukee-countys-use-risk-assessment-tool-keeps-some-people-outjail-while-awaiting-trial#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/RU4K-XYD5].
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rationales for enacting sensible cash bail reforms. Finally, this Comment will
propose that Wisconsin adopts a statewide approach that identifies and applies
specific parameters for assessing risk to communities in determining the
financial considerations that must be met for release prior to trial.
II. THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM
A. What is Cash Bail?
Bail is the most common mechanism employed by courts to allow arrestees
to secure their pretrial release.21 Bail—also called cash bail or money bail—
specifically refers to the monetary conditions required for release.22 Bond, on
the other hand, may refer to the full set of conditions for release.23 Holding a
detainee on remand occurs when a judge does not permit release under any
conditions, and the individual remains in custody until the court date;24 this
occurs most frequently in incidents involving serious felony matters such as
murder, armed robbery, and rape, among other charges.25 In addition to other
non-financial considerations, courts routinely assess a monetary figure that
must be paid in part or in full in order to be released upon arrest.26 Depending
on jurisdiction, this amount may be subject to a set, uniform schedule codified
by the legislature or involve judicial discretion based on the surrounding
circumstances of the arrest.27 In most jurisdictions, arrestees have the option to
either front the full amount of bail to the court, which is typically returned for
appearing for trial, or obtain the services of a commercial bonding service.28
The commercial bondsman pays the full amount of bail in exchange for a
nonrefundable fee, typically 10% of the bail amount.29 The allowance of a
commercial bail system results in a host of issues, which will be discussed in
further detail in Subsection C.30 While more jurisdictions are moving away

21. PAUL BERNARD WICE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., BAIL AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY
10 (1973).
22. Id.
23. 7 LAWRENCE K. MARKS, ROBERT S. DEAN, MARK DWYER, ANTHONY GIRESE & JAMES A.
YATES, NEW YORK PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4:2 (2d ed.).
24. WICE, supra note 21, at 22.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at 6, 13–14.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id.
30. See infra Section II.C.
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from the exclusive practice of cash bail,31 its use is still statutorily permitted in
a majority of states.32
The American bail system is based on an Anglo-Saxon foundation that
dates back for centuries.33 In medieval England, courts were created to resolve
blood feuds between individual parties.34 Because claims largely manifested
between closely-related individuals to avoid war and further bloodshed, the
courts were less concerned with the risk of harm that defendants could pose to
the larger community.35 As such, bail was imposed as an impediment to
abscondence and manifested as an amount identical to the sentenced
punishment.36 If the defendant did flee or abscond, the bail amount would be
granted to the plaintiff party and the matter would be resolved.37 Since its
adoption in the United States, few comprehensive changes have been made to
the cash bail system.38
B. The Inherent Flaws of Cash Bail
Across the nation, jurisdictions typically assess bail primarily on the
number of charges and the degree of the offense alleged (i.e., misdemeanor
versus felony) and not the overall risk of the accused to abscond or pose a threat
to the community.39 Increasingly, these excessively high bail amounts are
actually detrimental to the pretrial success of having detainees appear in court.40
Additionally, excessively high bail amounts are leaving presumptively innocent
individuals detained and inducing an inflated number of guilty pleas.41
“Zombie predictions,” or bail assessments made without considering individual
circumstances beyond the alleged charges, may render inadvertently stiffer

31. Jordan Gross, Devil Take the Hindmost: Reform Considerations for States with a
Constitutional Right to Bail, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1043, 1065–68 (2018).
32. Id. at 1078–79.
33. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, PRETRIAL JUST.
INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 1 (2010).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally id. Of note, the few most prevalent laws related to the cash bail system include
the Judiciary Act of 1799, the Bail Reform Act of 1966, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
39. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future
of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1775 (2018).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1772.
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punishments.42 For example, judges failing to consider whether individuals are
single, working parents or a student may create a harsher imposition on these
individuals due to their busier schedules.43 By placing stiff bail considerations,
without respect to an individual’s own character and circumstance, the judicial
system places a seemingly objective standard on all detainees, effectively
marginalizing individuals who may truly achieve pretrial success.44 While the
alleged offenses or number of alleged charges may provide some indication of
the level of risk that arrestees may have on their communities, imposing bail
conditions for the level of alleged severity instead of a reasonable amount to
guarantee appearance runs counter to our constitutional principles.45
1. Disparate Effect on Poor People
The use of cash bail has a disproportionately harsher impact on indigent
detainees compared to more affluent detainees. Over the past decade, it is
estimated that the median bail amount for felony defendants is around
$12,000.46 In 2015, the median annual pre-incarceration income for people in
local jails unable to satisfy their monetary bail was $15,598.47 With the median
bail amount representing such a high percentage of this large population’s
annual income, the ability to satisfy cash bail could require the expenditure of
several months of income for these detainees.48 In a practical sense, indigent
detainees are stuck incarcerated for often minor offenses with “low” bail
amounts despite not being a considered a risk to society or threat to flee.49
These bail amounts are relatively low in the sense that sums under $1,000 likely
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
See PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE
ECONOMICS
OF
BAIL
AND
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
7
(2018),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/BailFineReform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P6BT-CPGD]; BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INST.,
DETAINING THE POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL
TIME
1–2
(2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6S8A-VAA4].
47. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INST., PRISONS OF POVERTY:
UNCOVERING THE PRE-INCARCERATION INCOMES OF THE IMPRISONED (July 9, 2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/AL4P-7P49].
48. RABUY & KOPF, supra note 46, at 2.
49. Nicholas P. Johnson, Cash Rules Everything Around the Money Bail System: The Effect of
Cash-Only Bail on Indigent Defendants in America’s Money Bail System, 36 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 29,
30–31 (2017).
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are not a severe imposition on many Americans; however, the same sums would
place a high financial impediment on release for most detainees, as a majority
of detainees are considered to be living below the poverty level.50 In some cities
across the country, like Baltimore, Maryland, detainees often remain
incarcerated for failing to afford bail amounts as low as $100.51 In the landmark
case Stack v. Boyle, the Court held that “the function of bail is limited . . . [and]
must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence
of that defendant.”52 This decision reaffirms the notion that bail is a mechanism
for ensuring appearance for trial53—and not a pretrial punishment for alleged
offenses. Legal scholar Insha Rahman succinctly depicts the antithetical nature
of cash bail as such:
The idea that money bail mitigates the risk of failure to appear
has long been axiomatic within this country’s bail system. The
logic is simple—a financial stake in a person’s case means they
have an incentive to come back to court, otherwise they risk
losing their or someone else’s money or property. If that were
true, however, one would expect dramatically different rates of
court appearance when people are released under financial
conditions versus when they are released on their own
recognizance or under non-financial conditions.54
Nevertheless, courts routinely hold detainees solely based on an antiquated
fear of abscondence.55 In the case of low-income detainees, the incentive and
resources to flee are much less than that of higher-income arrestees.56 Due to
the advent of modern technology and exponentially larger law enforcement
departments, the fear of “low-cost” abscondence should be dramatically
reduced.57 With GPS technologies, more interconnected police forces, and
improved tracking services, the ability to cross state lines or remain undetected

50. Id. at 30.
51. MELISSA NEAL, JUST. POL’Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE
OF
USING
MONEY
FOR
BAIL
17–18
(2012),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7654K9LV].
52. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
53. Id.
54. Insha Rahman, Undoing the Bail Myth: Pretrial Reforms to End Mass Incarceration, 46
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 845, 859 (2019).
55. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1352 (2014).
56. Id. at 1351–53.
57. Id. at 1352–53.

ABDELLATIF_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:1005

from police pursuit for a substantial amount of time is greatly diminished.58
While abscondence is still possible, successfully fleeing would likely require
far more financial resources than what is available to most detainees.59
Detainees possessing greater financial resources may capitalize on their wealth
to secure the tools to abscond, such as transportation, new phones, and access
to new income in a different location.60 For higher-income individuals capable
of making bond, the likelihood of abscondence is far greater.61 This dichotomy
represents one of the greatest shortcomings of the cash bail system: people with
the greatest resources and risks to flee remain able to do so, whereas people
with fewer resources are disproportionately disadvantaged based on their
income.
The excessive use of cash bail perpetuates a recurring cycle of poverty
among indigent detainees held on charges of poverty.62 Bail amounts are
typically a result of bail schedules, which are legislatively or judicially
predetermined amounts of financial consideration that may be required for
certain offenses.63 As referenced, in Maryland, bail amounts can be set as low
as $100.64 However, these low bail amounts do not correlate to equitable access
to release.65 For crimes of poverty or low-level misdemeanor offenses,
detainees may not be subject to a hefty bail amount yet still be unable to be
released due to inability to pay their bail amount.66 While not necessarily
justified, persons committing crimes of poverty are likely doing so out of
necessity and as a result of currently living in poverty. Furthermore, the
financial impediments associated with bail potentially induce untrue
confessions and lead to more frequent guilty pleas.67 With more guilty pleas
that are not truly indicative of guilty conduct, the effects of bail on low-income
detainees are an increased rate of recidivism and lengthier sentences.68 As such,

58. Id.
59. Id. at 1352.
60. Id. at 1361–62.
61. Muhammad B. Sardar, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives?: Ending Cash
Bail and Its Impact on Pretrial Incarceration, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1440–42 (2019).
62. RABUY & KOPF, supra note 46, at 4.
63. James A. Allen, Note, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining the
Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 641 (2017).
64. NEAL, supra note 51, at 18.
65. Id.
66. Allen, supra note 63, at 651–52.
67. Sardar, supra note 61, at 1440.
68. Id. at 1435–38.
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it follows that persons committing crimes of poverty will likely remain
incarcerated for longer periods of time simply because of their inability to pay
relatively high bail amounts.69 Thus, the American bail system is inadvertently
creating a judicially-imposed cycle of poverty.
Even without any conviction, arrest and detainment immediately impute an
assumption of guilt for many individuals. As soon as a person is seated in the
back seat of a police car, the social notions of guilt often manifest within
communities.70 Upon arrest, the detained individual begins what many legal
scholars have coined “purgatory” as the criminal justice system is initiated.71
At this time, detainees typically undergo an arduous process in which they are
stripped of their belongings, fingerprinted, photographed, and then returned to
a large, open cell of other detained individuals.72 Upon the setting of any bail
or bond, it can then be weeks or months before any further court proceedings.73
Considering the financial restraints of many detainees, the imposition of bail is
in consequence a sentencing of guilt, for their time spent in custody may exceed
the eventual sentence if ever convicted.74 As one legal scholar puts it, “[p]retrial
detention sets the status quo at imprisonment.”75
In addition to costs levied onto the detainee, bail places increased costs
upon the family members and support systems of incarcerated individuals. As
discussed earlier, bail can usually be a privately paid amount that is later
returned for successfully appearing in court.76 However, this amount paid is
essentially suspended until the conclusion of an individual’s case.77 If a
percentage of the bail is paid to a commercial bondsman, then the fee is likely
surrendered entirely.78 As a result, indigent family members who gather to pay
these amounts for bail are then left for weeks, months, or potentially years
without those financial resources necessary for groceries, rent payments, and

69. See Allen, supra note 63, at 651–52.
70. DAVID RAY PAPKE, CONTAINMENT AND CONDEMNATION: LAW AND THE OPPRESSION OF
THE URBAN POOR 25 (2019).
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2540 (2004).
76. See supra Section II.
77. See supra Section II.
78. See supra Section II.
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other bills as the case continues to move through the criminal justice system.79
Similarly, if a detained individual is the primary income generator for a lowincome family or household, their detention imposes another financial
hardship.80 In this scenario, the time an indigent detainee remains incarcerated
due to an inability to post bail represents unearned wages, lost employment,
absence from education, and other departures from means that could later place
the detained individual in a better position financially to post bail—and likely
avoid committing the initial crime of poverty.81
2. Increased Cost to Taxpayers
Recognizing that there undoubtedly remains a need to detain dangerous
individuals following arrest, the costs to the American people are still
considerable. In 2011, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder stated that housing
the nearly two-thirds of the incarcerated population awaiting trial costed
approximately nine billion dollars per year82––accounting for close to 10% of
the Department of Justice’s annual budget.83 Thus, taxpayers are collectively
paying billions of dollars each year for pretrial incarceration despite the practice
not always leading to the most efficient or effective results for avoiding pretrial
misconduct. Many scholars argue that municipalities should reallocate funds
used for housing detainees towards alternative pretrial methods such as remote
monitoring, displaced supervision, and house arrest.84 Scholars have
demonstrated that active supervision of arrestees exponentially decreases costs
compared to pretrial detention.85 Studies on the use of electronic monitoring
devices estimated a daily cost reduction of one hundred dollars per person
compared to incarceration.86 Others have suggested that cellphone and social
media use can be a much more cost efficient means of tracking detainees

79. NEAL, supra note 51, at 13.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id.
82. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial
Justice (June 1, 2011) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generaleric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice [https://perma.cc/KJN9-FJQT]).
83. Aimee Picchi, The High Price of Incarceration in America, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2014, 5:53
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-high-price-of-americas-incarceration-80-billion/
[https://perma.cc/U3WG-GEZL].
84. See Gross, supra note 31, at 1103; Johnson, supra note 49, at 68–69; Sardar, supra note 61,
at 1452–53; Allen, supra note 63, at 668–69.
85. Allen, supra note 63, at 658–59.
86. Johnson, supra note 49, at 90–91.
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pretrial.87 With some of these methods already in use by courts, specifically
electronic monitoring devices, expansion of their use could be more readily
available and more reliable. Additionally, they may serve as a more efficient
and less invasive means of ensuring pretrial success. Moreover, a departure
from incarceration towards modern supervision methods may reduce overall
costs on taxpayers, allow arrestees to continue earning their own incomes, and
potentially avoid the judicially imposed cycle of poverty.
3. No Statistically Significant Effect on Pretrial Success
The cash bail system has not always demonstrated success in ensuring a
defendant’s appearance for trial or reducing the risk of abscondence. From
1990 to 2004, between 21% and 24% of felony defendants released prior to
their court date failed to appear.88 When considering the other goals associated
with setting bail, like reducing the potential to reoffend or pose further risk to
the community, the percentage of “pretrial misconduct” increased to 33%.89
Included in this figure is failing to appear, as well as being arrested for any
crime, being arrested for a felony, or completely absconding, all of which are
considered the primary dimensions of pretrial misconduct.90 Among those
whose release did result in pretrial misconduct, 83% had a prior arrest and 75%
had a prior conviction.91 These figures underscore the importance of properly
assessing risk in the determination of bail and not giving an arbitrary
assignment of cash bail. In some states, courts have still found success when
not relying solely on the imposition of cash bail for release.92 The Pretrial
Services Agency for the District of Columbia reported a 91% court appearance
rate in 2016, and this measure exceeded the 88% figure in the other four
reported years (2014–2018).93 Following the implementation of the Public
Safety Assessment in New Jersey, courts reported much higher pretrial success

87. Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What’s the Price for Freedom?, 17
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 171, 216 (2015).
88. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL RELEASE OF
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 8 (2007).
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5–6.
92. Rahman, supra note 54, at 859.
93. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND
PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST: FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 25 (2019), https://www.csosa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/2019/03/PSA-FY-2020-CBJ-Performance-Budget-Request-3-1819.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NXA-QF2D].
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vis-à-vis an 89% court appearance rate in 2017.94 The specific measures
employed by New Jersey and Washington D.C. are discussed further in Section
III.95 In some jurisdictions still relying largely on the use of cash bail, like New
York, they have nevertheless found success when releasing defendants without
monetary conditions.96 In 2017, New York City reported that 86% of
defendants released on their recognizance appeared in court for their trial.97
Changes in legislative policy, however, have affected the state of cash bail in
New York State. More discussion of the bail system in New York City and
New York State is provided in Section V.98
C. Commercial Bond
1. Background
Commercial bail is the practice in which private surety providers secure a
defendant’s funds necessary to make bail in exchange for a non-refundable
fee.99 The allowance of commercial bail may provide a false sense of relief for
indigent defendants. While they may not be able to independently afford bail
to be released, detainees may seek the services of a commercial bondsmen or
bonding company to secure payment of the bail. However, this practice leads
the commercial bail industry to not only serve as a second assessor of risk but
also capitalize off innocent defendants, regardless of their trial outcome.100
When detainees are granted bond with the condition of money bail, without the
means to post this bail, their most available recourse is a commercial bondsman.
Despite detainees being eligible to be released, the bonding company can also
determine which detainees will be eligible for their services and assess their
own risk standard.101 This determination places another imposition upon the
release of those arrested. Additionally, bonding companies typically assess a

94. N.J. JUDICIARY, 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 14
(2019), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=dSE [https://perma.cc/MGT5
-H7TQ].
95. See infra Section III.
96. Rahman, supra note 54, at 859.
97. AUBREY FOX & STEPHEN KOPPEL, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, PRETRIAL RELEASE
WITHOUT
MONEY:
NEW
YORK
CITY,
1987–2018,
at
9
(2019),
https://issuu.com/csdesignworks/docs/cja_rwm_final/2 [https://perma.cc/BD47-N99Y].
98. See infra Section V.D.
99. Gross, supra note 31, at 1070–71.
100. Id. at 1072.
101. Id.
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fee of 10% of the full bail amount when rendering their services.102 This fee is
not returned to the detainee regardless of their pretrial success.103 For detainees
able to pay their own bail amount, the bail amount is typically returned to them
for appearing in court.104
2. Status of Implementation
As of 2018, Wisconsin is one of four states in the country to have outlawed
commercial bail.105 Despite commercial bail being outlawed since 1979, the
legislature has advanced few developments to the cash bail system, but it has
revisited the notion of reviving the commercial bail system. Over the last two
decades, state legislators and interest groups have continuously mounted
attempts to restore the practice within the state.106 Thus, the presumption that
commercial bail will continuously be disallowed is not a foregone conclusion.
Opposition from judges and local law enforcement officials has successfully
stymied these movements for the time being,107 but few affirmative changes
have taken place to further distance the state from the practice of imposing any
financial considerations related to release.108 However, the state is not devoid
of any progress. In place of complete cash bail reform, Wisconsin has
undertaken steps to implement more evidence-based decision making by
judges.109 Specifically, the court system began evaluating and piloting the use

102. Id. at 1075.
103. Id. at 1070–71.
104. Id.
105. WIS. STAT. § 969.12 (2019–2020); Gross, supra note 31, at 1071.
106. See Sheila Terman Cohen, Bail Bond Industry Fights Back Against Moves To Limit Or End
Cash Bail, WISCONSIN WATCH, (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2019/01/bail-bondindustry-fights-back-against-moves-to-limit-or-end-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/2GBU-BJ3L]; Jason
Stein & Karen Herzog, Scott Walker Issues 57 Vetoes, Signs $68 Billion Wisconsin Budget,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, (June 30, 2013), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/scottwalker-makes-57-vetoes-signs-68-billion-wisconsin-budget-b9944038z1-213757881.html
[https://perma.cc/VMU8-6UQQ]; Bruce Murphy, Bail Bond Bill Will Create Debtor’s Prisons, URB.
MILWAUKEE, (May 21, 2013, 12:45 PM), https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2013/05/21/murphys-law-bailbond-bill-will-create-debtors-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/C84U-388L].
107. COLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM HARV.
L. SCH., BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 73 (2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=9a804d1d-f9be-e0f0-b7cd-cf487ec70339&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/JUQ7-E7K7].
108. Id.
109. Id. at 74.
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of drug courts and diversion programs.110 The Assess, Inform, and Measure
Program was instituted in 2006 to track the evidence-based factors related to
crime recidivism and effectuate change in sentencing.111 While these programs
and practices have come with their own successes for the convicted, they fail
to remedy the liberty impositions on those detained before they are found guilty.
III. HISTORICAL RESPONSE TO PANDEMICS IN PRISONS
While novel in that its rapid transmission shuttered many of the world’s
largest economies for months, COVID-19 is not the first instance of widespread
infection permeating throughout American incarceration facilities. In 1918,
prisons served as a breeding ground for the influenza pandemic.112 Several
medical studies identified outbreaks within the San Quentin State Prison in San
Quentin, California as an early hub for the viral infection’s growth and
transmission across the United States.113 Less than twenty years prior, in 1890,
comparable influenza outbreaks were discovered in correctional facilities.114
Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, the detention of immigrants moving
into New York City led to large outbreaks of typhus, which later resulted in
quarantines and a high death rate for the newly immigrated population.115 In
addition to the spread of typhus, poor jail infrastructures led to the spread of
cholera throughout New York City and other areas where immigrants were
entering and being detained.116 Tuberculosis is another infectious disease that
has continuously wreaked havoc in American correctional facilities.117
Coupled with a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis affected an
immense number of incarcerated individuals from the 1970s into the 1990s.118
110. SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN, PLAN. AND POL’Y ADVISORY COMM., EFFECTIVE
JUSTICE STRATEGIES SUBCOMMITTEE, PHASE II: PROGRESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 5 (2013),
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/committees/docs/finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MVJ-QGCF].
111. Id. at 6.
112. Strassle & Berkman, supra note 16.
113. Thomas James Ronald Finnie, Ian M. Hall & Steve Leach, Behaviour and Control of
Influenza in Institutions and Small Societies, 105 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 66, 67–70 (2012); Niyi
Awofeso, Prisons Show Prophylaxis for Close Contacts May Indeed Help in Next Flu Pandemic, 329
BRIT. MED. J. 173, 173 (2004).
114. Finnie, Hall & Leach, supra note 113, at 68.
115. Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past
and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 72–73 (2007).
116. Id. at 74.
117. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in The Era of AIDS: Reflections
on Public Health, Law, And Society, 54 MD. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995).
118. Id.

ABDELLATIF_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

DOES PUBLIC HEALTH START WITHIN JAILS?

1021

Between 1976 and 1978, over 90% of inmates in New York City infected with
tuberculosis were also infected with HIV or AIDS.119 Despite a relatively large
number of infections in the 1980s, cases of tuberculosis in correctional facilities
rose to almost 1,200 in 1993; this marked a 400% increase from the 1980s.120
From a practical standpoint, transmission of viral infections and deadly
diseases within prisons is unsurprising.121 Among other inadequacies to curb
transmission, correctional facilities place inmates in close confinement with
one another, typically have scant medical resources, and are often comprised of
already more susceptible and immunocompromised individuals.122
Additionally, there is a recent trend in the United States of a larger proportion
of elderly individuals becoming incarcerated.123 The CDC has stated that
individuals over the age of sixty-five are more susceptible to the more harmful
consequences of viruses like COVID-19 and other viral infections.124 There are
a variety of reasons why correctional facilities and the incarcerated population
doubly presents a susceptible model for rapid infection, it is clear that viruses
like COVID-19 could easily infect a large majority of a facility’s population
within days.125
Moreover, containing the spread of a disease or virus within correctional
facilities is typically not a government’s main priority when tasked with curbing
a large epidemic or pandemic level infection. In many events, pandemic level
infection within correctional facilities is often discovered far too late or not at
all.126 Despite a readily available surplus of vaccines for the 2009 H1N1
Influenza virus, which manifested into its own pandemic, many facilities never
received the doses to vaccinate their detainees and protect them from
contracting the virus.127 During the early months of COVID-19, over half of
the largest clusters of cases in the United States emerged within jails or

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Strassle & Berkman, supra note 16.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. COVID-19 Information for Specific Groups of People, supra note 8.
125. See How COVID-19 Spreads, supra note 9.
126. Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 73–75
(2020).
127. Severe Influenza Among Children and Young Adults with Neurologic and
Neurodevelopmental Conditions, 60 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1737, nos. 51 & 52,
(Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA) Jan. 6, 2012, at 1737–39.
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prisons.128 In some facilities, over 80% of detainees tested positive.129
However, these figures represent only what is known from well-reported and
regularly tested facilities.130 An early lack of testing resources, coupled with
low priority diversion for correctional facility use, has led to a severe result of
undertesting within detention centers.131
In 2021, access to vaccinations has actually improved for incarcerated
populations. In fact, in most states, the vaccination rate for detainees mirrors
or exceeds the national vaccination rate.132 However, multiple factors leave this
population still vulnerable to transmission. Notably, the vaccination rate of
facility staff members is lower than the vaccination rate of the incarcerated
population in an overwhelming majority of states.133 In Alabama, at the end of
2021, the vaccination rate of staff members was 23%, compared to 66% of the
incarcerated population. A 43% gap persists in Kansas, where 48% of the staff
are vaccinated compared to 91% of incarcerated persons.134 Considering the
constant close contact between incarcerated persons and unvaccinated staff
members, transmission will still occur among vaccinated detainees and
continue to present serious health risks.
IV. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT REMEDIES
Across the criminal justice system, there are prosecutors, judges, and
defense attorneys who can all agree to the deficiencies of the cash bail system
in the United States.135 Most notably, the issues of systemic racism within the
criminal justice system are multifaceted and often well-articulated. The extent
of racial biases in the criminal justice system exceeds the scope of this
Comment. However, it is prudent to identify and briefly discuss some of the
barriers to an equitable bail system.

128. Coronavirus in the U.S., supra note 10.
129. Kovarsky, supra note 126, at 73.
130. Id.
131. Peter Eisler, Linda So, Ned Parker & Brad Heath, Across U.S., COVID-19 Takes a Hidden
Toll Behind Bars, REUTERS (May 18, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/health-coronavirus-usa-jails/ [https://perma.cc/5MDG-JY5K].
132. Covid Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA L., https://uclacovidbehindbars.org
[https://perma.cc/YWZ6-QJND]; Josh Holder, Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html
[https://perma.cc/FS5Q-B2V8].
133. Covid Behind Bars Data Project, supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. Sardar, supra note 61, at 1434.
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Bail schedules have eliminated the positive use of judicial discretion in
setting bail.136 Instead of individualizing the assessment of release, judges and
prosecutors instead defer to the set amounts typically codified by the state
legislature.137 Bail schedules—once a method of employing discretion to
determine the level of risk abscondence—have transformed the discretionary
method into a systematic one, requiring set financial requirements for release
regardless of the threat of fleeing.138 Judges are increasingly pressured to use
or blindly adhere to bail schedules.139 This occurs, in part, due to the steadfast
need for judges to be “tough on crime”—a common election priority for judicial
candidates to earn or retain their place on the bench.140 Without said priority,
judges are perceived as weak and ineffective at protecting their communities.141
Thus, bail schedules reinforce an important disconnect between effectively
prioritizing the safety of a community and the liberties of a detainee.
Even in other parts of the country where bail schedules are not necessarily
mandated, issues of systemic racism have permeated the independent tool of
prosecutorial discretion.142 Charging decisions by prosecutors in a number of
jurisdictions reveal that African-American and Latino individuals are more
likely to be detained pretrial than White Americans.143 In state prisons across
the country, Black Americans are incarcerated at almost five times the rate of
White Americans.144 Despite comprising only 6% of the state’s population,
Black Wisconsinites represent 42% of the state’s prison population.145
Commentators point to “pervasive racial bias” to explain the state’s staggering
imprisonment of Black Americans.146 It would be wholly irresponsible and
improper to label prosecutors as willfully misusing their discretion; instead, the
136. Johnson, supra note 49, at 51–53.
137. Id.
138. Sardar, supra note 61, at 1434.
139. Allen, supra note 63 at 653–56.
140. Wendy R. Calaway & Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV.
795, 804 (2018).
141. Id.
142. Sardar, supra note 61, at 1438.
143. Id.
144. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 4 (2021), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21084578/the-colorof-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EEG-FXRT].
145. Id. at 20.
146. Claire Amari, Wisconsin Imprisons 1 in 36 Black Adults. No State Has a Higher Rate.,
WIS. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 16, 2021, 7:00 AM) https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-imprisons-1-36-blackadults-no-state-has-higher-rate [https://perma.cc/7SKB-7GCQ].
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wide latitude generally granted to prosecutors provides great variance across
the nation.147 For U.S. Attorneys, charging involves an “individualized
assessment,” which does not need to conform to what the arresting officer has
determined but what may further the purposes of federal law.148 In plea
bargaining, disparities in deals are attributed to the inexperience of
prosecutorial staff, regional differences, and the frequently harsher treatment of
Black, Latino, and immigrant detainees.149 This is just a glimpse into some of
the speculated inconsistencies and their underlying causes. Given the broad
autonomy afforded in prosecutorial discretion, there should be more objective
standards to assess the risk of the individual and not merely the alleged charge.
A detainee’s initial contact with the criminal justice system is perhaps the
most crucial one, occurring before any plea deal or judicial sentencing. Police
interaction is one of the most important components of the criminal justice
system and, in some form, has precipitated the mass incarceration problem
plaguing America. Flawed policing practices include, among others, stop and
frisk detention,150 broken windows policing,151 and zero tolerance policing.152
In many respects, these policing tactics have been widely criticized or
condemned for allegedly racist underpinnings.153 In Floyd v. City of New York,
Judge Shira Scheindlin held that the New York City Police Department’s stop
and frisk program ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, observing that
“officers are directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain racially defined
groups for stops.”154 Beyond just direct policing activity, requests for law
enforcement intervention disproportionately target Black Americans.155 Here
147. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,
1089–90 (2017).
148. Id. at 1090 n.99 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att'ys' Manual § 9-27.300 (1997).
149. Bibas, supra note 75, at 2475.
150. Darius Charney, Jesus Gonzalez, David Kennedy, Noel Leader & Robert Perry, Suspect
Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City, 14 CUNY L. REV. 57, 71–72 (2010).
151. Mike Rowan, The Illusion of Broken Windows Theory: An Ethnographic Engagement with
the Theory That Was Not There, 9 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2017).
152. Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero
Tolerance Discipline in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1401–03 (2012).
153. Renata M. O’Donnell, Note, Challenging Racist Predictive Policing Algorithms Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 544, 544 (2019).
154. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
155. Kevin E. Jason, Dismantling the Pillars of White Supremacy: Obstacles in Eliminating
Disparities and Achieving Racial Justice, 23 CUNY L. Rev. 139, 144 (2020); Moriah Balingit, Racial
Disparities in School Discipline Are Growing, Federal Data Show, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/racial-disparities-in-school-discipline-are-growing-
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in Milwaukee County, county officials concede that the local governments have
exasperated mass incarceration by allocating increasingly more funds towards
policing instead of other resources which may also reduce crime.156
Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges represent three vitally
important components of the criminal justice system. In some form, all three
are restrained from propagating a flawed bail system. Collectively, these
restraints perpetually oppress a vulnerable class of detainees.
V. THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT & CURRENT PROGRESS
A. Abolishment of Cash Bail in Illinois
On February 22, 2021, Illinois became the first state in the United States to
wholly abolish the use of cash bail.157 The cash bail provision is a part of the
Illinois Pretrial Fairness Act, which arises out of a larger effort to reform law
enforcement and pretrial practices within the state and makes changes that,
among other things, require more detailed reporting in handling deaths in
custody, mandate body camera use for law enforcement officers, and address
issues within police unionization.158 The legislation requires the use of cash
bail to cease by 2023.159 Furthermore, the law would instead prioritize
increasing resources such as pretrial officers to efficiently reduce the

federal-data-shows/2018/04/24/67b5d2b8-47e4-11e8-827e-190efaf1f1ee_story.html
[https://perma.cc/999B-DD3J]; see also Brandon Griggs, Living While Black, CNN (Dec. 28, 2018,
8:37
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/us/living-while-black-police-calls-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S3L5-PGZC]; Erik Ortiz, #WhileBlack: Calling Police on Black People Become
Teachable Moments for Law Enforcement, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2018, 2:23 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/whileblack-calling-police-black-people-becomes-teachablemoments-law-enforcement-n889276 [https://perma.cc/8ZXW-TEA8].
156. Amari, supra note 146.
157. Cheryl Corley, Illinois Becomes 1st State to Eliminate Cash Bail, NPR (Feb. 22, 2021, 9:35
PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/22/970378490/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-eliminate-cash-bail
[https://perma.cc/J6EJ-A5S5].
158. Derek Cantu, Illinois Lawmakers Vote to End Cash Bail, NPR ILL., (Jan. 13, 2021, 6:28
PM),
https://www.nprillinois.org/post/illinois-lawmakers-vote-end-cash-bail-4#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/8XFQ-NHB4]; Dan Petrella, Illinois General Assembly Approves Sweeping Criminal
Justice Overhaul that Would End Cash Bail, Require Cops to Wear Body Cameras, CHI. TRIB., (Jan.
13, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-illinois-legislature-criminal-justice-20210113rr6bt2x6jndxff5ttnwhz6qhay-story.html [https://perma.cc/SL6W-46YB].
159. Marcia M. Meis, Illinois Courts Prepare for the Pretrial Fairness Act, ILL. CTS. (Mar. 30,
2021),
https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/News/935/Illinois-Courts-Prepare-for-the-Pretrial-FairnessAct/news-detail/ [https://perma.cc/VR6V-2HDR].
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incarcerated population.160 Importantly, the law’s departure from cash bail does
not equate to a judge’s inability to hold potentially dangerous individuals. For
certain offenses such as violent felonies and domestic violence crimes, judges
may still hold individuals on remand.161 While time will truly determine the
success of this legislation, Illinois’s actions undoubtedly create a new opening
to sensible bail reform across the country. Because the state is home to the
largest city in the Midwest and one of the highest crime rates in the country,162
lawmakers across the United States will certainly seek to understand where the
state succeeds and fails regarding the end of cash bail.
B. Model Reform
Washington D.C. has also enacted and implemented innovative reforms to
its systems of pretrial release. While Illinois has become the first state to
completely abolish the use of cash bail, Washington D.C. has spearheaded the
move towards more judicial discretion in determining other alternatives for
pretrial release.163 What began as the D.C. Bail Project in 1963, the Pretrial
Services Agency for the District of Columbia operates as a judicial mechanism
to expedite the information gathering necessary to make release decisions and
carries out the release process for defendants within the District.164 Here, law
enforcement personnel work with detainees and assess the detainees’ risk of
pretrial misconduct.165 By exploring the individual facts and circumstances of
these cases, the judicial system is better equipped to impose bail when
necessary and confidently release individuals back into their communities as
they await their next court hearing. The adoption of the D.C. Bail Reform Act,
which passed in 1992, allowed the jurisdiction to be seen as an innovator in the

160. Jason Asenso, Pretrial Fairness Act Would Make Illinois the First State to Abolish Cash
Bail, INJUSTICE WATCH, (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/2020/pretrialfairness-act-bill-end-cash-bail-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/KQ6R-6HZD].
161. Id.
162. Samuel Stebbins, The Midwest Is Home to Many of America’s Most Dangerous Cities, USA
TODAY (Oct. 26, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/10/26/crime-ratehigher-us-dangerous-cities/40406541/ [https://perma.cc/A4WR-3NMC]; Midwestern United States,
WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/midwest-states
[https://perma.cc/E6NR-UHD5].
163. Rahman, supra note 54, at 857.
164. PSA’s History and Role in the Criminal Justice System, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR
D.C., https://www.psa.gov/?q=about/role [https://perma.cc/A3W6-3PZK].
165. Id.
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nation, as it effectively disallowed the use of cash bail.166 In 2017, 94% of
defendants release was not contingent on any financial considerations.167 Yet,
88% of defendants successfully appeared to all court dates.168 Additionally,
98% of released defendants were not arrested for a violent crime prior to their
trial.169 The District touts the following progressive reforms for effectuating
change: least-restrictive forms of bond; “cite and release,” which renders
citations for low-risk misdemeanors as opposed to incarceration; efficient
assignment of public counsel; twenty-four hour charging decisions; and a
pretrial services agency that supervises and expedites the release process.170 As
a whole, these practices and strategies provide for less invasive detention and
fewer incarcerations of individuals posing little or no risk of pretrial
misconduct.
Despite the jurisdiction’s high crime rates, Washington D.C. officials
remain confident in its bail reform efforts. Senior Judge on the D.C. Superior
Court, Truman Morrison, defends the bail reform as a necessary process to
properly safeguard the community.171 Specifically, Judge Morrison recognizes
cash bail as a tax on the poor and not an effective preventor of recidivism.172
For many of the crimes that are continuing to be committed, most of them are
bail eligible in other jurisdictions.173 Thus, Morrison counters that the absence
of bail does not further incentivize the commission of crimes.174 In fact, many
reports have failed to link bail reform efforts with increases in crime.175 For
166. Clifford T. Keenan, We Need More Bail Form, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C.,
https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/390 [https://perma.cc/JM56-4GEW].
167. Beatrix Lockwood & Annaliese Griffin, The State of Bail Reform, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/30/the-state-of-bail-reform
[https://perma.cc/P978-MRTX].
168. Id.
169. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., RELEASE RATES FOR PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS
WITHIN WASHINGTON, DC (2017), https://www.psa.gov/sites/default/files/2016%20Release%20Rat
es%20for%20DC%20Pretrial%20Defendants.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZV8K-C339];
Performance
Measures, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., https://www.psa.gov/?q=data/performance_measures
[https://perma.cc/87JA-HZ3N].
170. Keenan, supra note 166.
171. Interview by Melissa Block with Truman Morrison, Senior Judge, D.C. Sup. Ct. (Sept. 2,
2018).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Holmes Lybrand & Tara Subramaniam, Fact-Checking Claims Bail Reform Is Driving
Increase
in
Violent
Crime,
CNN
(July
7,
2021,
4:10
PM),
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Washington D.C., bail reform efforts may have not achieved as much of the
crime reduction it anticipated, but there is no indication it has increased crime,
and it has not detained presumptively innocent individuals simply based on
their inability to post bail.
C. Public Safety Assessment
1. Overview
Over the last several decades, private organizations and policy groups have
conducted research and recommended mechanisms better equipped to balance
respecting the liberty interest of detainees and the safety aspect of reducing
pretrial risks.176 One of the leading, and more widely implemented policy
directives, is the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), which considers nine factors
in determining the potential chance of pretrial success.177 More specifically,
the assessment uses a combination of these factors to determine the likelihood
that a detainee will fail to appear for their court date, be rearrested for any
criminal offense, or be arrested for a violent offense.178 The PSA algorithm
provides jurisdictions with a more judicious and less disparately impactful
method of releasing detainees that is supported by nationwide data.179 States
such as Arizona, Alaska, California, and Kentucky have adopted the
assessment.180. New Jersey was one of the first to adopt it and was arguably
the most successful state-wide jurisdiction to implement the PSA.181

https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/07/politics/bail-reform-violent-crime-fact-check/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WA49-MXQD].
176. See About the Public Safety Assessment: How the PSA Works, ADVANCING PRETRIAL
POL’Y & RSCH., https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/ [https://perma.cc/6LQF-CHNU]; Our
Approach, THE BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/PVJ9-CG7H];
NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., A RIGHT TO LIBERTY: REFORMING JUVENILE MONEY BAIL 5 (2019),
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/NJDC_Right_to_Liberty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFL38W64].
177. Public Safety Assessment: How It Works, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH. (May
2020), https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/ [https://perma.cc/3D6B-DLUG].
178. Id.
179. William M. Carlucci, Comment, Death of A Bail Bondsman: The Implementation and
Successes of Nonmonetary, Risk-Based Bail Systems, 69 EMORY L.J. 1205, 1221–22, 1228 (2020).
180. Id. at 1228.
181. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West 2017).
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2. New Jersey
In New Jersey, the manner in which the PSA is implemented requires
judges to essentially exhaust all potential considerations before imposing a
monetary bail on detainees.182 As a result, New Jersey has swiftly moved away
from the use of money bail.183 Following the state’s implementation of the
PSA, money bail was imposed on only forty-four detainees in 2017.184 While
it is not clear the number of times money bail was imposed on pretrial detainees
before the implementation of the PSA, the shift away from money bail has led
to reductions in at least several thousands of cases.185 Prior to implementing
the PSA, in 2013 alone, over 5,000 pretrial detainees remained incarcerated
simply due to an inability to satisfy their money bail.186 As a whole, this
transition away from money bail has led to a 94% release rate for pretrial
detainees and reduced the overall New Jersey jail population by 20%.187 These
legislative changes have been lauded by judges in New Jersey as they
reaffirmed the important presumption of innocence until proven guilty.188
Given the state’s geographical proximity and connection to states such as New
York and Pennsylvania, the pretrial efforts in New Jersey may lead to
successful implementation across the region. Bail reform efforts have occurred
in New York, but they have since been rolled back; this is discussed later in this
section.189
3. Milwaukee & Dane County
Responding to the relative inaction by the state legislature, individual
Wisconsin counties have undertaken some of these cash bail reforms to mitigate
the impact of financial bail on indigent arrestees. In 2016, Milwaukee County
implemented the PSA to better determine the potential risk among arrestees,

182. Carlucci, supra note 179, at 1236–37; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West 2017).
183. DOYLE, supra note 107, at 45.
184. Id. at 49.
185. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, LUMINOSITY, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS 11–
12 (2013).
186. Id.
187. DOYLE, supra note 107, at 49.
188. See Carlucci, supra note 179, at 1246; David J. Reimel III, Comment, Algorithms &
Instruments: The Effective Elimination of New Jersey’s Cash Bail System and Its Replacement, 124
PENN ST. L. REV. 193, 193–95 (2019).
189. See infra Section V.D.
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and Dane County followed suit in 2017.190 In Milwaukee, the progress
associated with implementing the PSA has been lauded by judges and
prosecutors for allowing low-risk arrestees to return to their communities.191
Over the last several months, the progress made by Dane County proved to be
critical in lowering the transmission of the coronavirus within its facilities.192
Here, the reforms taken in counties like Dane County and Milwaukee County
yield multiple positive advances; the reduction in the jail population led to
fewer positive cases in their facilities and more low-risk individuals safely
returning to their homes and contributing to their households, workplaces, and
local economies.193
Local efforts to reduce the disproportionate effect of bail are materializing
in the absence of statewide bail reform. In March 2021, the Milwaukee
Common Council established the Milwaukee Police Department Diversion
Task Force.194 The task force is designed to create “a plan for responding to
calls for service that do not involve threats to public safety, particularly for
those involving persons experiencing mental health, substance abuse or
homelessness crises, with trained, unarmed first responders.”195 Importantly,
this process reorients the criminal justice system for many low-risk individuals
who would otherwise have a different interaction with armed law enforcement
officers. The plan further calls for the response staff to be civilians with special
training in de-escalation and mental health issues.196 Slated to begin in mid2022, this effort demonstrates an indirect way to alleviate the effects of bail on
indigent and low-risk individuals in Milwaukee.

190. Supporting the Implementation of the PSA Tool, JUST. SYS. PARTNERS,
https://justicesystempartners.org/projects/supporting-the-implementation-of-the-psa-tool/
[https://perma.cc/JY9N-D68G].
191. Kenechukwu Okocha, Nationwide Trend: Rethinking the Money Bail System, 90 WIS. LAW.
30, 30 (2017); Jeffrey A. Kremers, Milwaukee Moves Away from Money Bail System, 90 WIS. LAW.
38, 40–41 (2017); Henzl, supra note 20.
192. Becker, supra note 20.
193. Id.
194. Statement by Chantia Lewis, Alderwoman, City of Milwaukee, Council Passes Legislation
Creating
the
MPD
Diversion
Task
Force
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/ccCouncil/News/2021/District09/3_23MPDDiversionTaskForceStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR44-KPQX].
195. Id.
196. Frederica Freyberg, First Responders for Mental Health Incidents, PBS WIS. (July 9, 2021),
https://pbswisconsin.org/news-item/first-responders-for-mental-health-incidents/
[https://perma.cc/BQQ3-NY4Q].
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The efforts to minimize the number of pretrial detainees remaining in
custody serve oppressed populations, like African-Americans, who are
disproportionately affected by the coronavirus and pretrial detention.197 In
Wisconsin, Black Americans comprise 6% of the state’s population;198
however, 90% of the state’s Black population resides in six of the state’s
counties, including Milwaukee and Dane County.199 The largest county in the
state, Milwaukee County, also contains the largest proportion of AfricanAmericans, who make up over 25% of the county’s population.200 Thus, these
sensible reforms may proactively combat systemic issues within cash bail that
have negatively impacted minority communities.
D. Failures
Bail reform efforts have not fully matriculated into success in all
jurisdictions undertaking recent efforts. In 2019, New York State passed
substantive bail reform measures that significantly reduced the number and
types of charges where a judge may hold a detainee on remand or without
bail.201 The law sharply reduced the percentage of cases eligible for remand or
imposition of bail;202 over 80% of the cases arraigned prior to the bill’s passing
in 2019 would have been ineligible for bail or remand.203 Prior to its repeal and
eventual amendment,204 local political leaders—including then Governor
Andrew Cuomo—praised the legislation.205 Governor Cuomo underscored the
major impetus for enacting cash bail reform when he articulated this message,
197. Becker, supra note 20.
198. African Americans in Wisconsin: Overview, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS. (Sept. 10,
2018),
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/minority-health/population/afriamer-pop.htm
[https://perma.cc/WXV6-RCED].
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Julie McMahon, New York Ends Cash Bail for Most: What It Means for People Charged
With
A
Crime,
SYRACUSE.COM
(Apr.
3,
2019,
1:29
PM),
https://www.syracuse.com/news/2019/04/new-york-ends-cash-bail-for-most-what-it-means-forpeople-charged-with-a-crime.html [https://perma.cc/M89Z-F8BW].
202. MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM
REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK’S AMENDED BAIL LAW ON PRETRIAL DETENTION 1 (2020),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2020/Bail_Reform_Revisited_0
50720.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7E9-Z97A].
203. Id.
204. Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform. What Will the Rest of The Country
Do?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/23/innew-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-a-cautionary-tale-for-other-states [https://perma.cc/Z2YN-UUH3].
205. Id.

ABDELLATIF_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1032

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:1005

“The blunt ugly reality is that too often, if you can make bail, you are set
free, . . . and if you are too poor to make bail, you are punished.”206 However,
the efforts were deemed too broad-stroked and heavy-handed.207 Less than six
months after the bill’s implementation, Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill
de Blasio endorsed a rollback of the bail reform efforts and later amended the
law.208 While the bill did create a dramatic drop in pretrial detention, the law’s
successes were instead engulfed in media attention surrounding high-profile
crimes209 where the defendant was not held on remand or bail was not
imposed.210
In New York, the new system of bail reform measures was likely too broad
in its approach but was not afforded an appropriate amount of time to truly test
its efficacy. By rolling back the efforts in less than six months, amid a
pandemic,211 the state cannot fully assess the lasting successes that may have
arisen from the now amended law. In New York, the rollback of bail reform
efforts may have been a reaction to the increased media attention surrounding
certain egregious crimes. Understandably, these bail measures were easy
targets upon realization that certain crimes were not bail or remand eligible.212
As such, it is imperative for states to engage in sensible reforms. New York’s
efforts might have been too aggressive in its approach to eliminate cash bail.
New York State provides an example of how bail reforms may fail yet still lend
sensible solutions and markers of improvement.
E. Public Health Induced Efforts
Amid the ongoing pandemic, state governments and local facilities are
proactively taking steps to mitigate the transmission of the novel coronavirus
in jails and prisons. In Colorado, the state law enforcement agencies suspended
206. Gloria Pazmino, Cash Bail Will Mostly End in 2020. Here’s What That Could Look Like.,
SPECTRUM NEWS NY1 (Sept. 9, 2019, 8:24 PM), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/allboroughs/politics/2019/09/10/cash-bail-ending-in-new-york-in-2020-what-could-it-look-like
[https://perma.cc/6BG8-YPXC].
207. Lartey, supra note 204.
208. Id.
209. Yael Halon, New York Lawmaker Says Cuomo Will Have ‘Blood on His Hands’ If Bail
Reform Law Isn’t Changed, FOX NEWS (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/media/nicolemalliotakis-new-york-bail-laws-cuomo-de-blasio [https://perma.cc/P2V5-TQW6].
210. Roxanna Asgarian, The Controversy over New York’s Bail Reform Law, Explained, VOX
(Jan. 17, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/1/17/21068807/new-york-bailreform-law-explained [https://perma.cc/9QYM-SSCH].
211. Lartey, supra note 204.
212. Asgarian, supra note 210.
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arrests for low-level parole violations specifically to reduce incarceration
numbers.213 In Ohio, the Cuyahoga County Jail refused to admit additional
detainees charged with misdemeanors—with the exception of domestic
violence related charges—to combat the spread of COVID-19 within the
facility.214 In Maryland, Marilyn Mosby, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore
City, announced her office would dismiss pending charges for drug offenses,
trespassing, minor traffic offenses, and other nonviolent crimes to combat the
spread of COVID-19 in local facilities.215 These are just three of the many216
temporary actions that have taken place to remedy the disruptive effects
COVID-19 has inflicted on the incarcerated population. The COVID-19 public
health crisis reveals that improvements in public health and public safety may
actually be intertwined and simultaneously achieved.
VI. WHAT WISCONSIN SHOULD DO
In 2021, the State of Illinois led the charge by becoming the first state to
wholly abolish the use of cash bail. More local municipalities have carried on
these efforts for many years, including within the state of Wisconsin. In
Wisconsin, state legislators should enact sensible reforms for statewide
assessment of pretrial detention. The practices consistent with the PSA, which
has been launched in both Milwaukee and Dane Counties, should receive more
attention as to their effectiveness. Instead of arbitrarily adhering to bail
schedules, judges and prosecutors are being, and should be, tasked with truly
assessing the risk of release among detainees. In light of a continuing
pandemic, it could be advantageous to offer bail-free release for low-level
offenses to prevent rapid transmission within jails and promote the continuation
of employment, education, and other means to avoid the commission of crime.

213. The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy Changes from the COVID-19 Pandemic,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html
[https://perma.cc/M3F2-4QTE].
214. Cory Shaffer, Cuyahoga County Jail Stops Accepting New Inmates Charged with Most
Misdemeanors to Prevent ‘Explosion’ of Coronavirus Cases Amid Historic Surge, CLEVELAND.COM
(Nov. 17, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/11/cuyahoga-county-jailstops-accepting-new-inmates-charged-with-most-misdemeanors-to-prevent-explosion-ofcoronavirus-cases-amid-historic-surge.html [https://perma.cc/C7VY-UNJQ].
215. Tim Prudente & Phillip Jackson, Baltimore State’s Attorney Mosby to Stop Prosecuting
Drug Possession, Prostitution, Other Crimes Amid Coronavirus, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 18, 2020,
8:33
PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-cr-mosby-prisoner-release20200318-u7knneb6o5gqvnqmtpejftavia-story.html [https://perma.cc/EY9P-8PTA].
216. PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, supra note 213.
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The PSA is not a comprehensive solution to combatting increasing
incarceration numbers but should be one of many tools employed to improve
Wisconsin’s bail system. Risk assessment should be expanded and vetted to
move towards more sustainable pretrial practices. These risk factors can be
expanded to embrace more options than just bail or no bail for detainees.
Wisconsin courts should embrace more modern technology such as electronic
monitoring devices, which provide a less invasive and less expensive method
of surveilling defendants than standard incarceration. For defendants with low
potential risks of harmful contacts with other persons, these modern solutions
may provide a vital step in mitigating the historically damaging effect of pretrial
detention for presumably innocent individuals. Before imposing stiff
conditions for release, judges and prosecutors should consider the collateral
consequences of said detainment; public health inside correctional facilities
should now enter the equation. Bail should not be the definitive requirement
for all detainees but instead should serve as a backstop for the court’s most
dangerous and most likely to abscond, flee, or otherwise result in a pretrial
failure. By putting resources towards the more accurate assessment of which
detainees truly pose a risk to the community and which detainees do not, the
people, courts, and communities of Wisconsin will benefit exponentially.
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